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Conclusion
Although the term probable cause is used to describe the rational
persuasiveness of the evidence necessary to instigate prosecution, search
and arrest, there are significant differences in the evidence needed for
each. The liublic interest protected as well as the private interest invaded
by each action influence the granting of judicial review as well as the
evidentiary standard to be applied. Although there are major jurisdic-
tional differences as to the capability of hearsay to achieve the required
degree of probability for each action, the standards indicate a substan-
tially lower degree of probability required to initiate prosecution than
that required for arrest and search. The validity of such standards de-
pends in part on a realistic appraisal of the consequences of criminal
prosecution, arrest, and search in contemporary society.
PROVING THE FALSITY OF ADVERTISING: THE McANNULTY
RULE AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
In 1902 the Supreme Court, in American School of Magnetic Heal-
ing v. McAnnulty, set out a principle which prescribed one of the boun-
daries of a valid Post Office fraud order. In the past half century, re-
spondents in administrative proceedings under several federal statutes
have urged the principle as substantiation for such a variety of conten-
tions that considerable confusion has resulted.2
At the turn of the century, a number of organizations advocated the
proposition that the mind of a human being was largely responsible for
the ills of the body, and was a discernible factor in the treating and curing
1. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
2. An indication of the variety of contentions can be had from noting the several
situations for which applicability of the rule has been urged. It was significant in three
criminal mail fraud cases: Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928) ; Bruce
v. United States, 202 Fed. 98 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Harrison v. United States, 200 Fed. 662
(6th Cir. 1912). Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion to Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920), applied the principle of McAnnulty to statements made by defend-
ants convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. The rule has also been advanced
in argument in various civil and state court cases. Dilliard v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866 (1921) (revocation of doctor's license) ; Fougera
& Co. v. City of New York, 224 N.Y. 269, 120 N.E. 642 (1918) (violation of sanitation
ordinance-failure to disclose contents or curative effect of medicine on the label);
Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Holland, 141 Fed. 202 (D. R.I. 1905) (in defense to a suit
brought to enjoin the distribution of a product with a confusingly similar name) ; Welt-
mer v. Bishop, 171 Mo. 110, 71 S.W. 167 (1902) (suit for libel by partners in an
organization similar to the American School of Magnetic Healing; motion for rehearing
based on the decision in the McAnnulty case, denied).
NOTES
of these ills.3 The Postmaster General issued a fraud order against one
such group, the American School of Magnetic Healing. The organiza-
tion then filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of the order. The bill al-
leged that the business of the school was to accomplish this process of
healing. Further, it was alleged that there was no connection with any
religious tenets, such as those held by the Christian Scientists. The al-
leged basis for the healing was "the innate power, through proper ex-
ercise of the faculty of the brain and mind, to largely control and remedy
the ills that humanity is heir to."' The Supreme Court reversed the sus-
taining demurrer and remanded the case to the lower court with leave to
the Postmaster General to answer. The statute under which the Post-
master General had acted authorized him to issue a fraud order in those
circumstances where the respondents were engaged in a "scheme or device
for obtaining money through the mails by false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises."'  In interpreting the statute, the Court
declared that the representations had to deal with matters of fact in order
to be a proper subject of a fraud order, because the statute did not apply
to mere matters of opinion which are not capable of being proved false.
A statement can be shown to be matter of fact or matter of opinion either
by judicial notice or by trial evidence.6 With respect to the allegations,
the Court took judicial notice that the effectiveness of any product was
a fruitful source of opinion, even though the great majority may be of
one way of thinking. Upon this premise the court held that the state-
ments in the allegations were matters of opinion, because the current
state of medical knowledge, so far as it could be judicially noticed, in-
dicated that the statements were matter of opinion. That is, lacking
judicial notice that the statements were matters of fact, the conclusion
was that they were matters of opinion.! In such situations, the Postmaster
3. The report of Weltner v. Bishop, 171 Mo. 110, 71 S.W. 167 (1902), discloses
that the belief and advocation of the principles of healing through control of the mind
was advanced by several groups.
4. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 96 (1902).
5. REv. STAT. § 3929 (1890), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1926). It is interesting
to note that while the statute is worded in the disjunctive--"false or fraudulent," the
courts have interpreted that phrase as though the words were joined with an "and." See,
for example, Rosenberger v. Harris, 136 Fed. 1001, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1905).
6. Whether this is shown by judicial notice or by trial evidence depends, in most
instances, on the procedural context in which the issue is raised. If the issue arises on
demurrer, the court must base its decision on the allegations of the parties and on what
it could judicially know. But when the case has proceeded on the merits, the court may
either determine the issue on the basis of the evidence which the parties have introduced
through the testimony of experts or it may decide the issue on the basis of its own
knowledge-judicial notice.
7. A convention should be established at this point: "Matter of opinion" refers
to the substance of the representation or advertising claim. It represents the notion
that the subject matter of the representation is in an area where there are not reliable
professional conclusions. "Matter of fact" refers to the opposite situation, where such
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General may not, without anything more in the way of proof, issue a
fraud order.8 Of course, since this case came up on demurrer, no other
proof could be shown.'
It is to be noted that the principle of the McAnnulty case is simply
that if a statement on its face is matter of opinion, that is, one which by
the standard of judicial notice cannot be regarded as matter of fact, a
fraud order should not be issued. The McAnnulty case set no standard
other than judicial notice for making this determination.' Although the
rule of the case has been invoked by respondents in many instances, no
case has been discovered where the same issue-demurrer--was ever
again raised." Before examining the context in which the courts have
given effect to the rule, it would be proper to further examine the rule.
In the prior discussion the issue is presented by demurrer. Where,
however, the case proceeds to trial and evidence is introduced, two other
issues are presented. First, does the evidence show that the representa-
tion" is matter of opinion or fact? If the evidence directed to this issue
shows that the representation is matter of opinion then this concludes
the case, and the judgment will be against the government.' If, how-
ever, the evidence shows that the representation is matter of fact, then
the second question arises: If it is matter of fact, is it true or false, It
is quite conceivable that a representation can be categorized as matter of
conclusions are possible. Occasionally, the courts and the respondents have used the
word "opinion" in different connotations. Where that is the case, the use they have
employed is to be distinguished from "matter of opinion."
8. In the McAnnulty case, the Court placed its ultimate conclusion on this ground.
"Unless the question may be reduced to one of fact, as distinguished from mere opinion,
we think these statutes cannot be invoked for the purpose of stopping the delivery of
mail matter." 187 U.S. 94, 106 (1902). "The opinion entertained cannot, like allega-
tions of fact, be proved to be false, and therefore it cannot be proved, as matter of fact,
that those who maintain them obtain their money by false pretenses or promises as ihat
phrase is generally understood, and as, in our opinion, it is used in these statutes." 187
U.S. 94, 107 (1902).
9. The Court carefully preserved the right of the Postmaster General to shwv a
factual violation of a law at a later stage. "In overruling the demurrer, we do not
mean to preclude the defendant from showing on- trial, if he can, that the business of
the complainants, as in fact conducted, amounts to a violation of the statutes as herein
construed." 187 U.S.-94, 111 (1902).
10. The Court's opinion does not suggest how matters of fact can be distinguished
from matters of opinion, but rather is concerned only to show that the statements are
matters of opinion in this case.
11. Alhough the issue of demurrer may not have occurred again, similar situa-
tions-ones calling for judicial notice-have been presented in circumstances where no
expert evidence has been introduced. Gottlieb v. Schaffer, 141 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. N.Y.
1956); Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1942) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 659
(1942) ; Farley v. Simmons, 99 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1938) cert. denied, 305 U.S. 652
(1939). These cases will be discussed in detail at a later point in the text.
12. The word "representation' as it is used throughout the text refers to the ad-
vertising claim itself. Its use is not intended to signify the conventional legal connota-
tion which requires that the statement be one of past or tir-sently existing fact.
13. See note 8 supra.
NOTES
fact and yet not be false. If the respondent has contested both issues, he
must succeed on at least one of them in order to prevail. The govern-
ment must succeed on both or lose the case for failure of preponderant
proof.
No cases have been discovered where the courts have enunciated
this analytical approach; they have not made it clear that there is a two
step problem. Most frequently they have appraised the evidence and
recited that since it showed that the representation was false, the repre-
sentation could not concern matter of opinion. While this is a correct
result, it combines what are properly two separate conclusions. This has
a tendency to obfuscate the two issues. The confusion is manifest in
some lower court decisions which say that since the proof was not suf-
ficient to show falsity the statement was matter of opinion.'" Such a
conclusion does not necessarily follow, for even though a statement may
not be false, it may still be matter of fact. It appears that where the
court takes this -approach it is assuming that "opinion" is the antithesis
of "falsity."' 5  This assumption is incorrect. However, what a court
might really be doing in such a situation is concluding that it cannot re-
solve the conflict of evidence going to the issue of falsity; and, then, in-
stead of saying that the government has failed in sustaining its burden
of persuasion, the court uses the word "opinion" as a talismanic label.
The rule of the McAnnidty case has been improperly cited as author-
ity for several other propositions. A strict application of the rule would
necessarily limit it to Post Office fraud orders." Nevertheless, the rule
has been used by respondents in appealing from the cease and desist or-
ders of the Federal Trade Commission and judgments under the food
and drug laws.' The McAnnulty case has also been urged upon the
courts as announcing a rule applicable to fraudulent intent.' Such an in-
terpretation or application is completely erroneous. The issue of fraud
was never reached in the McAnnulty decision. Moreover, to say that the
14. In Farley v. Simmons, 99 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 652
(1939), the court noted the conclusions of the lower court were that since the proof of
falsity had not been established, the representation was mere matter of opinion.
15. The antithesis of "falsity" is "truth." This is the second step determination.
The first issue that must be resolved is whether the substance of the representation is
matter of fact or matter of opinion.
16. A respectable application of the doctrine of stare decisis dictates confining the
authority of the case to the jurisdiction exercised by the Postmaster General under the
fraud order statutes. Moreover, the conclusions reached by the Court in McAnudty
are cast in terms of the postal statutes.
17. However, the issues in all three of these areas have at least a common de-
nominator, viz., proof of falsity. Therefore, its application to the other two areas is
justified analytically.
IS. Atlanta Corporation v. Olesen, 124 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ; Jeffries V.
Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Pinkus v. Walker, 61 F. Supp. 610 (D. N.J.
1945).
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McAnnulty rule goes to the question of fraudulent intent is to confuse
the substance of the representation with the state of mind of the pub-
lisher. These are two entirely different propositions, though it will be
developed below that the former may be evidence of the latter.
There have been several cases in which the court has eliminated the
initial question of matter of opinion or fact at the outset. In these in-
stances the court was justified in finding that there was no room for any
opinion, i.e., that it was obviously matter of fact. In Farley v. Simnwns,19
the appellee had advertised his pulp magazines so as to convey the notion
that they contained obscene matter.2" To be sure, the standard of ob-
scenity is perhaps a subjective one. This is because the line of demarca-
tion becomes more -hazy as one approaches the area that is not obscene.
However, the language of the opinion suggests that this advertising was
well beyond the hazy marginal area. Therefore, a "matter of opinion"
argument could not properly be raised.21  In Neher v. Harwood,12 the
appellant had constructed and operated a machine which he called a cos-
mic generator. He represented that when he placed cards, autographed
by the mail customer, into the machine, the machine would generate rays
which would improve the physical condition of the customer. Presum-
ably the rays would reach the customer wherever he was. In contesting
the validity of the fraud order, the appellant argued that his statements
were matters of opinion within the meaning of the McAnnudty rule. The
court denied the petition for injunction on the ground that the claims
were so patently absurd that there were no reasonable grounds upon
which an opinion could even be based. Therefore, the representations
were factual and false.2  In Gottlieb v. Shaffer,4 the petitioner con-
tended that there was no substantial evidence to support the fraud order.
The petitioner had advertised that the purchasers of his luck charms and
perfumes would experience the same good fortune experienced by former
19. 99 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S..652 (1939).
20. The proof before the court showed that in fact the booklets were not obscene.
The curious twist here is that the fraud order was based on the finding that the repre-
sentation was false and fraudulent, not that the magazines were obscene.
21. This case presents the peculiar situation where the issue, though not raised on
demurrer, was decided as a matter of law. The determination of whether a representa-
tion contained or suggested obscenity was a question of law. No expert witnesses were
needed to educate the court on this matter. Moreover, when the court determined as a
matter of law that the questionable matter was not obscene, then it also foreclosed any
argument based on "matter of opinion." In such a situation, McAnmilty is completely
excluded. The significant factors are that it was done by the court without the as-
sistance of any trial evidence, and that it was done as a matter of law.
22. 128 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 659 (1942).
23. "The facts of the two cases are not parallel. There was involved a school for
the understanding mind; here no understanding of any kind is premised." Neher v.
Harwood, supra note 22 at 853.
24. 141 F.Supp. 7 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
NOTES
purchasers. At the hearing, the petitioner conceded that the articles were
common things, not in themselves superstitious. Then, somewhat in-
consistently, he argued that the government had failed to introduce the
expert evidence which would be necessary to support the findings. To
this argument the court replied, "The short answer is that where claims
are completely opposed to common knowledge, their falsity may be in-
ferred from their preposterous character."2  The court clearly fore-
closed the possibility of there being any question of opinion. That is,
the court judicially noticed that the representations were so absurd that
they were false on their face.2" Therefore, the statements were matters
of fact.27
At common law, the manner in which the representation is expressed
may be crucial. The general rule is that statements with reference to the
25. Gottlieb v. Schaffer, supra, note 24 at 16.
26. In reviewing the record, the court said, "The hearing officer found the plain-
tiff's claims 'so preposterous and opposed to common knowledge and experience as to
carry within themselves, without more, evidence of their falsity.'" With respect to
fraudulent intent the court declared, "Also it is not without interest that the Supreme
Court has held 'an intent to deceive might be inferred from the universality of scientific
belief that the representations are wholly unsupportable. . . .' In this instance the
claims defy universality of experience." Furthermore, the court said, "The very adver-
tisements furnish sufficient evidence to support this finding and there is no basis upon
which to overrule it." Gottlieb v. Schaffer, supra note 24 at 17.
27. In both Neher v. Harwood and Gottlieb v. Schaffer, the court determined the
fact-opinion issue without the aid of evidence. These were both cases where judicial
notice was the vehicle employed to decide the issue. In this respect they are somfiewhat
similar to the McAnnulty case. Furthermore, the two cases bear a resemblance to
McAnnulty on the procedural aspects of that case. In Neher v. Harwood, the district
court had sustained the government's motion to dismiss. In this respect, then, the result
reached in the case is the direct converse of the McAnnulty holding under similar cir-
cumstances. The government had moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to join the Postmaster General as an indispensable party. The circuit court
affirmed the dismissal on this ground. The appellant argued that the district court had
also ruled that there was no constitutional question involved. It is in the discussion of
this issue that the circuit court considered the application of the McAnnidty rule. Gott-
lieb v. Schaffer was decided on cross motions for summary judgment. Although in
summary judgment procedure affidavits of evidence are submitted, the court disclosed
that all that was necessary in this case was the advertising itself. Here also, under a
comparable procedural status, the result reached was the opposite of that reached in
McAnndty. In two other cases, the court could have used this approach. The first of
these was Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (E.D. Mo. 1904). The com-
plainant represented that "after years of research eminent physicians have at last dis-
covered a remedy which is endorsed by the medical profession as permanent in its
effect." Whether there had been an endorsement by the leading members of the medical
profession was wholly a matter of fact. Similarly, in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138
(1922), the complainant represented, among other things, that "there are in America
today millions of men between 17 and 65 years of age who are earnestly seeking relief
from sexual weaknesses in some form or stage." Here, too, the court could have found
that the representation was a matter of fact only. In the Neher and Gottlieb cases, the
court not only took judicial notice that the representations were matters of fact but also
that they were false and fraudulent. In the Wyman and Leach cases, the court could
only have used the judicial notice technique to determine the fact-opinion issue.
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future, being predictive in nature, are not actionable.2" These predictive
statements have been dubbed "expressions of opinion." This is not the
same connotation given the word "opinion" by the court in the Mc-
Annulty case. Typically, prospective help-verbs such as "will," "shall,"
or "would" are found in "expressions of opinion." The "opinion" in the
McAn iulty rule is applied where there is a lack of proof to show that the
substance of the statement is a matter of fact. Therefore, if the repre-
sentation of curative effect is stated prospectively, the iMlcAnnulty rule
is not automatically applicable. The court will treat the representation
as though the prospective element were not there.2"  In Dr. J. H. McLean
Medicine Co. v. United States, the reprehensible claim was stated pro-
spectively: "Gall Stones-Dr. J. H. McLean's Liver and Kidney Balm
will aid in the dissolving of kidney stones .... "30 This representation
was apparently the sole representation upon which the fraud order was
issued. The fact that it was prospectively phrased did not prevent the
court, on the strength of the evidence, from holding that the fraud order
was valid."' This compels the conclusion that representations which are
"expressions of opinion" do not automatically invoke the McAnnulty
rule, nor does their presence prevent a valid finding for a fraud order.
Having noted that in some situations the court has made a deter-
mination that the representation is matter of fact and, further, that pre-
28. This was the rule set out in Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51 (K.B. 1789).
Generally, however, the rule has been riddled by so many exceptions based on special
circumstances that it is of questionable value as a general proposition. The trend ap-
pears to be toward finding an exception wherever possible. One of the principles upon
which exceptions are posited is when there is implicit in the expression of opinion an
assertion that the publisher knows facts which make his opinion a representation upon
which the reader may justifiably rely.
29. The rationale behind the treatment accorded these predictive phrases may be
that either the court does not intend to follow the common law rule or that the cir-
cumstances of the cases present the necessary grounds constituting an exception to the
general rule. That the latter is more likely can be seen from Missouri Drug Co. v.
Wyman, 129 Fed. 623, 626 (E.D. Mo. 1904), where the complainant argued that his
advertising claims were mere expressions of opinion and, as such, could not accomplish
a fraud. Although the court held that some of. the representations were matters of
fact, it further noted that expressions of opinion could also be the basis upon which
a fraud order is posited.
30. 253 Fed. 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1918).
31. In addition to the McLean case and the Wyman case, there have been several
other instances where representations, prospectively stated, have been the subject of valid
fraud orders. In Fanning v. Williams, 173 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1949), the appellee had
advertised that his weight reducing plan would aid obese persons to lose weight easily
and safely. On the basis of the evidence, the court held the representation false and
fraudulent. In Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510 (1916), the appellants had
represented, "We know it . . .will cure Tuberculosis." Chief Justice Hughes, speak-
ing for the Court, squelched any remaining notions that all expressions of curative ef-
fect were opinions protected by the McAnnulty rule. He declared that only representa-
tions-be they predictive in nature or not-which could not be established as matter of
fact fell within the rule.
NOTES
dictive phraseology is no bar to a fraud order, we now turn to the ap-
plication of the M14cAnnulty rule to situations arising under statutory
regulation of advertising other than the postal statute used in that case.
Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act proscribes false advertising
as an "unfair method of competition."32  One of the early applications
of the McAnnulty rule to the act occurred in the L. B. Silver Co. case.3"
The petitioner, appealing from a cease and desist order, contended that
the commission's findings of fact were not supported by substantial evi-
dence. One of the petitioner's advertising claims was that it was market-
ing a separate and distinct breed of hogs. Although the experts agreed
on the basic facts, they could not agree that the petitioner's hogs were
a separate and distinct breed. Both groups of experts agreed that
whether there was a separate breed was a matter of fact; they differed,
of course, in their conclusion. The court remarked that the expert evi-
dence was equally balanced. In dismissing the commission's order to
this count, the court said that there was an honest difference of "opinion."
By this the court could have meant one of two things: either that the
conflict of the expert evidence was so substantial that the court felt that
the representation was not really a matter of fact; or that even though
the court considered the representation matter of fact the government
had not proved it false. Under the circumstances of the case-the bal-
anced expert conflict-the first rationale would have been a very logical
and correct one. Although the second would not be a logical one, it was
just as probable an alternative, inasmuch as this has been the typical
phraseology of the lower courts in applying the McAnnulty rule. If in
truth, the court did accept the petitioner's proposition as a fact, then it
would have been more accurate to have placed the decision on the
grounds of failure of proof, rather than on "opinion." '34
32. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1952). In Ford Motor Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941), it
was held that "unfair methods of competition" may consist generally of the false ad-
vertising of a product.
33. L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 Fed. 985 (6th Cir. 1923).
34. In another case, Proctor & Gamble v. Federal Trade Commission, 11 F.2d 47
(6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 717 (1926), the commission found the advertising
of the plaintiff to be false because it represented that its soap was a "naphtha" soap.
The commission found as a fact that the soap product contained a maximum of 2 of
1% naphtha. The manufacturer urged on appeal that the amount of naphtha which
would be effective as a cleansing agent was matter of opinion only. The court con-
ceded that there might be difficulty in determining the minimum amount of naphtha
which would be effective, but held that the question as to whether the plaintiff's soap
contained a sufficient amount of naphtha to be effective in any degree was an ultimate
fact which the commission could properly find. Since the claim "naphtha" was not
matter of opinion according to the ruling of the court, the representation could properly
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Beginning with Justin Haynes & Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion,3" the court, in a new line of cases, declined to upset the commission's
findings of fact where there was a conflict of expert testimony. The
attitude was that this question concerned the weight of the evidence and,
as such, was not a proper matter for the courts to review."6 In the
Haynes case, the essential finding was that there was such an insignifi-
cant amount of aspirin in the petitioner's compound that it had no thera-
peutic value for the pains it was represented to relieve. These findings
of fact were supported by the testimony of three experts called by the
commission. It was admitted that these experts had had no personal ex-
perience with the compound. Further, from the report of the case, it
does not appear that they were purporting to report the views of a sub-
stantial majority or of the entire medical profession. Rather, the opinion
indicates that the experts based their conclusions solely on their own
general medical and pharmacological knowledge."7 Despite the fact that
the petitioner called experts who expressed contrary conclusions and also
testified as to the experiments which they had conducted, the court sus-
tained the cease and desist order. 8 The significant aspect of the case is
the standard for proof of falsity which the court adopted. Implicit in
the finding that the advertising was false was also a finding that the
substance of the representations were matters of fact. The standard
be subjected to proof of falsity. Consequently, the court expressly excluded the applica-
tion of the rule of the McAnnulty case. Here the court had resolved the fact-opinion
issue on the basis of the evidence which had been presented at the hearing. Note
further, in Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930),
aff'd., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), the expert witnesses for the parties could not agree on the
proper meaning of "scientific" and "safe." The court found the divergence of com-
petent opinion as to these definitions to be so great that it was impossible for the com-
mission to make a finding of fact. However, the court expressly distinguished the in-
stant case from McAnmdty, ruling that the latter was inapplicable.
35. 105 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939).
36. "That this court is not permitted to pass upon the weight of the evidence is
too well established to require the citation of authorities." Justin Haynes & Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 35 at 989.
37. "General medical and pharmacological knowledge" has gained general ac-
ceptance by the courts in reviewing the cease and desist orders of the commission. John
J. Fulton Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 130 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 679 (1942) ; Neff v. Federal Trade Commission, 117 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1941);
Dr. W. B. Caldwell, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 111 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1940).
38. The real temper or attitude of the court can only be appreciated by noting the
manner in which the opinion was expressed. "It is true that the witnesses had no
personal experience with Aspirub and based their opinions upon their general medical
and pharmacological knowledge. They were, however, well-qualified expert' witnesses,
and the fact that other experts called by the petitioner expressed a contrary opinion and
testified to experiments cannot enable the petitioner to contend successfully that there
was no substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings." 105 F.2d 988, 989
(2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939).
NOTES
accepted here was a minimal one. 9 Actual experiments with the product
need not have been conducted, nor did the experts need to express the
general views of the medical profession. All that was required was that
th experts rely on their own general medical and pharmacological knowl-
edge, even though there was contravening expert testimony coupled with
experimental results. This standard or method of proof was adopted by
the courts in many of the succeeding Federal Trade Commission cases.4"
39. "Minimal" is used in a comparative sense. It anticipates the somewhat higher
standards that will be discussed at a later point. It is not used as connoting the lowest
possible standard.
40. In four cases the test was specifically adopted: Charles of The Ritz Distribut-
ing Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (rejuvenat-
ing qualities of petitioner's face cream) ; John J. Fulton Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 130 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 679 (1942) (effectiveness of
petitioner's product on diabetes) ; Neff v. Federal Trade Commission, 117 F.2d 495 (4th
Cir. 1941) (therapeutic value of petitioner's product as a remedy affording relief to
those suffering from prostatitis, cystictis, urethritis, catarrhal conditions of the urinary
tract, sugar diabetes, dropsy, etc.) ; Dr. W. B3. Caldwell, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 111 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1940) (therapeutic value of pepsin in Dr. W. B. Cald-
well's Syrup Pepsin). In three other cases the disparity in the qualifications of the
witnesses was so great that the expert opinion evidence for the government completely
overweighed the evidence introduced by the petitioner. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal
Trade Commrission, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950) (government: four expert dentists who
were leaders in their field; petitioner: one witness who had been educated in medicine,
had been a medical director in an industry and of an army hospital, and who was em-
ployed regularly by the petitioner; issue: therapeutic value of petitioner's toothpaste) ;
J. E. Todd, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 145 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (govern-
ment: a chemist who made an analysis, and three doctors-two of whom were special-
ists; petitioner: two osteopathic physicians; issue: therapeutic value of petitioner's
arthritis preparation); Irwin v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.
1944) (government: three doctors who had had wide experience in the special area;
petitioner: two chiropractors; issue: therapeutic value of petitioner's elaborate enema
device). In still other cases, the only expert evidence was that presented in support of
the complaint. Excelsior Laboratories, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 171 F.2d
484 (2d Cir. 1948) (The issue was the therapeutic value of petitioner's garlic tablets
for the treatment of high blood pressure. On the basis of a chemical analysis, a doctor
who had worked twenty-five years for the U.S. Public Health Service testified that
modern medical tests with the product disproved the petitioner's claims. This was held
to be substantial evidence.) ; Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 165 (7th
Cir. 1942) (Here the issue was whether petitioner's medicinal compounds-claimed to
relieve delayed menstruation-were dangerous. Gynecologists and obstetricians testified
that in their opinion the product was not safe if used as the petitioner directed. The
court held this to be substantial evidence.) There are also several pertinent cases
which did not get into the courts. In Evis Manufacturing Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
ff 26,002 (1956), the only expert testimony was that given on behalf of the complaint.
Their testimony was materially impaired when it was shown that their experiments were
faulty. Though the experts also contended that the device-a water conditioner-could
not operate as claimed because to so operate would violate the laws of physics, they did
not rule out the possibility that it might work. In view of this admission the examiner
recommended dismissal of the case, saying, "We must not take the risk of interfering
with the development of a device which may prove to be the first practical application
of a scientific principle heretofore undiscovered." The commission, on hearing before
the full body, remanded the case for the taking of additional evidence. 3 CCH TRADE
REaG. REP. J 26,320 (1956). In Pioneers, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25,986 (1956),
the commission dismissed a complaint based on alleged false advertising of a battery
additive. While it was agreed that the scientific evidence for the government out-
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In these cases the commission and the court had expert evidence
from which to determine whether the matter was fact or opinion. As-
suming that the first alternative was the one adopted by the court in the
Silver case-that the expert evidence was so evenly matched that the
court said that the matter was really not fact-then this was a perfect
application of the McAnnudty principle to a situation where the court has
heard the evidence." In the other FTC cases, of which the Haynes case
is representative, the initial determination whether the matter was fact
or opinion was implicit in the express conclusion that the advertising was
false. Moreover, the method of proof used to show falsity-the indi-
vidual expert's testimony based on his general medical and pharmacologi-
cal knowledge-was also sufficient to show that the substance of the
representation made in the advertising was a matter of fact.
Statutory Regulation of Food and Drugs
The "opinion" problem and the method of proof required to prove
a representation matter of fact and false also became important in the
cases under the food and drug statutes. Beginning with the 1912 Sherley
Amendment,4" jurisdiction under the Food and Drug Act of 1906"' was
extended to curative claims and representations." The statute proscribed
weighed that of the respondent, the commission held that the total weight of the evi-
dence favored the respondent in view of the significant user testimony. For further
explanation of this case consult S. REP. No. 1092 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954). In
two recent cases the commission has dismissed the complaint on the ground that the re-
liable clinical reports put in evidence by the respondent's experts refuted the government
expert testimony. The Knox Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 25,173 (1954) ; Hato Co., TRADE
REG. REP. 14,669 (1951).
41. That is, in this case, the court achieved a result similar to McAnnudty except
that the procedural stages of the cases differed. In McAimnlty, the Court decided the
fact-opinion issue on its own knowledge. In the L. B. Silver case, this decision was
based on the court's interpretation of the evidence.
42. 37 STAT. 416 (1912), 21 U.S.C. § 10 (1926).
43. 34 STAT. 768 (1906), 21 U.S.C. § 1 (1926).
44. In United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911), Justice Holmes declared
that the 1906 statute did not apply to representations of curative effectiveness. The dis-
position of the case was actually determined by this statutory interpretation. Neverthe-
less, in several instances, the case has been cited as authority for the proposition that the
McAnnulty principle applied to cases under the 1906 law before it was amended. Such
a use of the case was quite erroneous. Justice Hughes, in a vigorous dissent, felt that
the majority had interpreted the statute much too narrowly. In his view, Congress
intended that representations of curative effect be included within the 1906 statute. A
month after the Court had decided the Johnson case, the House Committee on Interstate
Commerce reported, "The decision of the Supreme Court in the Johnson case was con-
sidered so serious . . . by the President that . . . he transmitted to Congress a special
message calling for the necessity of passing at an early date an amendment to the
law. . . ." In 1912, the Sherley Amendment was passed. It recited that an article was
misbranded "if its package or label shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding
the curative or therapeutic effect of such an article or any of its ingredients or sub-
stances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent." The report of the House
Committee also dwelt at some length on the phrase "false and fraudulent." 48 CONG.
REc. APP. 675 (1911).
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any representation "regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of such
an article or any of its ingredients . . . which [was] false and fraudu-
lent."45  The defendant in Seven Cases v. United States46 had manufac-
tured a remedy which was heralded as a palliative for respiratory ail-
ments. He claimed that it was "[e] ffective as a preventative for pneu-
monia" and that "[w]e know that it has cured and that it has and will
cure Tuberculosis."4  The defendant argued that the new amendment
invaded the realm of speculation proscribed by the McAnnulty case.
Chief Justice Hughes said that Congress did not intend that all curative
claims should fall within that rule; had they so intended, the amendment
would have been a nullity.4" Without indicating what the method of
proof was, the court declared that the statements were false, inasmuch as
the proof showed that no medicine known would cure tuberculosis. Hav-
ing found the matter false and, therefore, implicitly that it was also a
fact, the court said that this was not a matter of opinion.49 In Dr. J. H.
McLean Medicine Co. v. United States," the defendant advertised his
nostrum as being able to dissolve kidney stones. Competent medical ex-
perts testified for the government that there was no known medicine
that would dissolve kidney stones and that there was no dispute among
the medical profession on this point. The defendant did not introduce
any expert testimony in its behalf. The court said that the testimony
which revealed the general agreement of medical opinion-"the uniform
course of medical opinion"-was competent to show the falsity of the
representation. Again, the court said that since the representation was
false, it was not matter of opinion. The method of proof accepted by
45. The report of the House Committee indicates that Congress deliberately in-
cluded the element of fraudulent intent, ascribing to it the usual common law meaning.
After the enactment of this amendment, the statutory standard under the Food and
Drug Act of 1906 was the equivalent of the postal statute which authorized the Post-
master General to issue fraud orders. 48 CONG. REc. App. 675, 676 (1911).
46. 239 U.S. 510 (1916).
47. Seven Cases v. United States, supra note 46 at 514.
48. Justice Hughes said that Congress ". . . deliberately excluded the field where
there are honest differences of opinion between schools and practitioners. It was, plainly,
to leave no doubt upon this point that the words false and fraudulent were used ...
That false and fraudulent representations may be made as to the curative effect of
substances is obvious." 239 U.S. at 517.
49. Justice Hughes continued, discussing the good faith which the publisher must
have. "It is said that the owner has a right to give his views regarding the effect of
his drugs. But state of mind is itself a fact, and may be a material fact, and false and
fraudulent representations may be made about it; and persons who make or deal in
substances or compositions are in a position to have superior knowledge and may be
held to good faith in their statements. . . . Congress recognized that there was a wide
field in which assertions as to curative effect are in no sense honest expressions, but
constituted absolute falsehoods and in the nature of the case can be deemed to have
been made only with fraudulent purpose." 239 U.S. at 517. Cf. Missouri Drug Co. v.
Wyman, 129 Fed. 623, 628 (E.D. Mo. 1904).
50. 253 Fed. 694 (8th Cir. 1918).
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this court in proving falsity (and fact) was the uniform course of medi-
cal opinion.51 This had very liberal overtones, for it meant that specific
tests of the questionable product would not necessarily be required. Pre-
sumably, the government's burden of persuading the court was ma-
terially eased by the adoption of this method of proof. That "uniform"
was not meant to be taken as the same thing as "without exception" can
be inferred from the court's language when it described the standard in
terms of "general agreement." However, the court does say that the
"general agreement" must be more than the testimony of an individual
expert based solely on his own knowledge where there is expert evidence
to the contrary.
In 1938, Congress completely revised the food and drug laws.52 The
new statute proscribed all curative claims which were "false and mis-
leading in any particular."5  This revision of the law left out the re-
quirement of fraudulent intent. The defendant in United States v. 7 Jugs
51. Note how this method of proof was forecast by the House Committee report.
"[Ilt is undesirable to permit misleading claims to be made simply because a few ex-
perts can be found on the occasion of a trial to support them. . . . One of the im-
portant application of section 201 (m) relates to this problem. [Section 201(m) defines
"labeling" as meaning "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon
any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."]
If only a few experts regard a label statement as true but the great body of qualified
experts in that particular field regard the statements as untrue, then there may be sub-
stantial ground for concluding that the curative claim is misleading unless it is qualified
in such a way to show the existence of conflicting opinion as to its truth." The dis-
cussion of the committee as to a rejected clause which the Senate Bill had contained
offers further insight into the problem. Section 17 (a) of the Senate Bill included the
explanatory sentence, "Any representation concerning the effect of a drug or device
shall be deemed to be false and misleading under this paragraph if such representation
is not supported by persons who, by reason of scientific training and experience, are
qualified as experts on the subject to which such representation relates." As a reason
for excluding the sentence, the committee said, "It was felt that if a maker were able
to obtain two or more persons who could qualify as experts and would testify in support
of the label claims, the Government's case would be lost despite the fact that every
competent expert in the country would unqualifiedly declare the claims to be false."
H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1938).
52. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301
(1952).
53. 52 STAT. 1040, 1050 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1952). "A drug or device
shall be deemed misbranded-(a) If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular."
One of the significant changes in this statute was the deletion of the requirement of
fraudulent intent. The reason for this deletion was discussed in the committee report.
"Section 502 defines misbranded drugs and devices. In its first paragraph it makes an
extremely important contribution to existing law in defining a drug as misbranded if its
labeling is false or misleading in any particular. The present law contains this provi-
sion with respects to representations concerning identity, strength, -quality, and purity of
the drugs, but therapeutic claims are amenable to actions only if they are false and
fraudulent. The persuasive effect of a false label on a consumer's mind is the same
whether the representations were made in good faith or not. It has been demonstrated
that effective protection of the public from falsely labeled nostrums is in many cases
impossible under this language." H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1938).
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of Dr. Salsbury's Rakos"4 claimed that his remedy was a cure for various
animal diseases. Contending that curative claims were opinions within
the meaning of the McAnnulty rule, the defendant requested an instruc-
tion to the jury that if his claims were directed to curative effects of his
product, the verdict should be for him. The court denied the request,
ruling that all curative claims were not protected by the McAnnulty rule;
only those claims which were matters of opinion fell within that rule. If
the claim was susceptible to proof of falsity, then a fortiori it was a fact
and was capable of being "false and misleading" as denoted by the
statute. Government experts had made exhaustive tests with the de-
fendant's product which showed that the solution was absolutely worth-
less with respect to the claims made for it." The court accepted the ex-
pert testimony based on these tests as sufficient proof of falsity.
Both of the methods of proof just reviewed-the uniform course of
medical opinion and the specific tests with the product-were accepted
with approval in Research Laboratories v. United States.6 The de-
fendant had represented that his drug was effective in the treatment of
arthritis, rheumatism, neuritis, sciatica, and lumbago. His defense was
patterned on the McAnnulty case. The court ruled that McAnnulty was
not applicable to the case because each of the three "limitations" on the
McAnnulty rule was present. By "limitations," the court was referring
to the methods of proof which could be employed to show the falsity of
a claim. Here again, the court went immediately to the question of fal-
sity, omitting to find expressly at the outset that this was matter of fact.
First, there was testimony with regard to the specific tests which had been
conducted with the product. Second, there was expert testimony report-
ing the consensus of medical opinion." Third, there was testimony" of
54. 53 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn. 1944).
55. The several experts for the government had conducted extensive experiments,
both in the laboratory and in the field. The appellant's experts were veterinarians em-
ployed by him. They testified to the results of their relatively few experiments. In
their opinion the compound was effective. The appellant urged that since the evidence
was in the nature of opinion-though the opinion of experts, it was within the "opinion"
rule of the McAnnidty case. The court dismissed this argument.
56. 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948).
57. The consensus method was also approved as substantial evidence in a subse-
quent case. In United States v. Wood, 226 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1955), the government
prosecuted an appeal from the dismissal of its libel by the district court. The appellee
made and distributed Diabena, representing it to be an effective cure for diabetes.
Government experts testified that it was their opinion and the opinion of the consensus
of the medical profession that no remedy taken orally-such as Diabena-could be a
cure for diabetes. The appellee called no witnesses to testify in his behalf, but submitted
affidavits from several doctors who attested to the success they had had with Diabena.
The circuit court, relying on Research Laboratories v. United States, 167 F.2d 410 (9th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948), held that the evidence of the consensus was
substantial evidence to support the government's case.
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experts who had not performed experiments that in their own profes-
sional opinion the claims were false.58 The impact of all three of these
methods of proof compelled the conclusion that the defendant's claims
were false. In a like manner, the conclusion that the representations
were matter of fact also followed.
Of the three methods just enumerated, the test method and the con-
sensus method had already been approved for proving falsity in previous
cases.59  The third method had never before been advanced as an ac-
ceptable one in food and drug adjudications." It should be recalled that
the McAnnulty rule was based on the premise that some representations
are in substance only opinion. In the situations where evidence has been
heard by the court, the evidence has aided the court in making a deter-
mination (implicitly at least) that the representation is either matter of
fact or matter of opinion. In most instances, this determination is not
expressly made before the falsity of the representation has been pro-
nounced. That is, the court has looked immediately to the true-false is-
sue. If the government has introduced the testimony of a competent
expert based on his own professional capacity, the court is likely to con-
sider this evidence in terms of the falsity issue. If the defendant wishes
to establish that this area of knowledge is still so unsettled that it is
only matter of opinion, it is incumbent upon him to demonstrate that
there is such a conflict of professional views on the subject that no con-
sensus can be found." The same approach should be used by the de-
fendant if he wishes to contend that even if it is matter of fact it is not
false. The defendant, in the instant case, did not introduce contravening
58. The court described this third "limitation" as expert testimony "where the wit-
ness has neither tested the product nor purports to report the consensus of medical
opinion. . . . " Research Laboratories v. United States, 167 F.2d 410, 416 (9th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948).
59. United States v. 7 Jugs of Dr. Salsbury's Rakos, 53 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn.
1944) ; Dr. 3. H. McLean Medicine Co. v. United States, 253 Fed. 694 (8th Cir. 1918).
60. Twenty-four years earlier under the old statute, a similar situation was pre-
sented. The appellant had bottled mineral waters claiming for them great healing
powers. A government expert witness testified that in his opinion the appellant's claims
were unfounded. On appeal the court stated that if the witness was qualified to speak
with respect to the product, his testimony would support the verdict of the jury that
the claims were false. Goodwin v. United States, 2 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1924).
61. Presumably, the defendant could show that there was no consensus either by
materially damaging the testimony of the government experts on cross-examination or
by introducing the testimony of his own experts. It would be well to point out that
no case has been found under this statute where the government has lost because the tes-
timony of its experts was badly shaken on cross-examination. Note, however, the suc-
cess of the plaintiff in the L. B. Silvers case where the testimony of his experts ef-
fectively upset the force of the government expert's testimony. (Of course, this was not
a food and drug case.) The logical inference seems to be that the defendant would have
a better chance of demonstrating that the representation was matter of opinion if he
used the testimony of his own experts. See further, The Knox Co., TRADE REG. REP.
1 25,173 (1954) ; Hato Co., TRADE REG. REP. f1 14,669 (1951).
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evidence which might have shown a divergence of competent medical
opinion. 2 In a case where there is positive, competent, and uncontro-
verted expert evidence, perhaps this third method has some merit. Cer-
tainly, however, if contravening expert evidence has been introduced, the
third method would not be sufficient; if it were then the consensus
method would be unnecessary. Note that the court in the McLean case
expressly declared, "The testimony of the physicians as to their indi-
vidual opinions of the efficacy of the preparation would have been
properly rejected if there had been disclosed a difference of medical
opinion . . ., as a conviction could not properly rest . . . upon mere
matters of opinion.. , " That is, where two medical experts give
opposing views which are based solely on their own individual profes-
sional convictions, the matter should not be interpreted and classified as
matter of fact upon which legitimate administrative determinations could
be posited."4 Thus, it appears that the better reasoning would be that
the third method advocated by the court in Research Laboratories v.
Uzited States has merit only in those instances where there is no conflict
of competent expert evidence.
In the food and drug cases just considered, the court, in every case,
decided the fact-opinion issue in favor of fact by the decision that the
defendant's advertising representation was false. How do these cases
compare with those decided by the Federal Trade Commission? After
the 1938 revision in the food and drug laws, the statutory proscriptions
in the two areas became the same, viz., false representations. The only
difference manifest in the two sets of cases has been in the different
methods utilized to prove falsity. 5
62. Furthermore, as authority for its third "limitation," the court relied upon four
cases. Only one case was a food and drug case-Goodwin v. United States, discussed in
note 60 supra. There was no expert testimony controverting that given by the govern-
ment's expert witnesses. The remaining three cases were Federal Trade Commission
cases. In Charles of the Ritz Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1944), the petitioner offered no opposing expert testimony. In both Irwin v.
Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1944) and John J. Fulton Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 130 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 679
(1942), the opposing experts did not purport to give an opinion on the general value of-
the product, but limited their testimony to revealing the results of their experiences with
the product. This testimony was accorded little probative value since the court ruled
that the tests were not properly controlled. The testimony of the government's experts
was accepted. In all four of these cases, therefore, it would be improper to say that a
real conflict of expert opinion testimony existed.
63. Dr. J. H. McLean Medicine Co. v. United States, 253 Fed. 694, 696 (8th Cir.
1918).
64. This assumes, of course, that the experts have relatively equal qualifications
and that their testimony carries about the same probative weight.
65. The method of proof acceptable by the courts in Federal Trade Commission
adjudications has been the testimony of the expert witness speaking from his general
medical and pharmacological knowledge. This has been sufficient even where opposing
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Post Office Fraud Orders
The first significant case after the McAnirulty decision to consider
the applicability of the McAnnulty rule to Post Office fraud orders was
Leach v. Carlile.66 The appellant represented that his "Organo Tablets"
were a "reliable treatment for all Nervous Affections, Nervous Debility,
Physical Weaknesses, and Functional Disorders."6  In his argument
before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the question de-
cided by the Postmaster General was that the substance which the ap-
pellant was selling did not produce the results represented; and that, since
there was a conflict of expert opinion, the representations were insulated
by the McAnnulty rule. The Court, however, decided that the Postmaster
General had not determined that the nostrum was entirely worthless-as
to which there was conflict of opinion-but rather that only some of the
claims were false. The Court interpreted the postal statute in such a
way that it could be directed against any of the claims of the appellant.
Therefore, it did not matter that as to some of the claims the McAnnulty
rule might have been a defense.6"
In Elliot Works, Inc. v. Frisk,69 the court approved specific tests as
a method for proving falsity. The respondent had represented that his
battery additive would charge batteries instantly, retain battery charge
indefinitely, eliminate corrosion, etc. Government experts, basing their
testimony on the elaborate tests made on the product by the Bureau of
Standards, testified that the advertising representations were false. The
claimant argued that these findings were based on the evidence of
opinion, and that opinion was insufficient as substantial evidence under
the McAnnulty rule."0 The court disagreed, noting that not only have
the opinions of experts been accepted as substantial evidence by the
experts with seemingly good qualifications testify to the contrary and also indicate the
results of their experiments. Compare that method with those in the cases just dis-
cussed, viz., consensus of professional opinion, specific tests on the subject product, and,
in some instances, the opinion of the individual expert.
66. 258 U.S. 138 (1922). Note that in point of time, the Dr. J. H. McLean Medi-
cine Co. v. United States, 253 Fed. 694 (8th Cir. 1918) and Seven Cases v. United States,
239 U.S. 510 (1916) preceded this decision.
67. Leach v. Carlile, 267 Fed. 61, 67 (7th Cir. 1920).
68. It is somewhat unusual that the court even considered the argument of the ap-
pellant. No reasonable interpretation of the statute could possibly afford the inference
that in every case the government must show the nostrum to be entirely worthless.
Therefore, the decision of this case in declaring that any of the representations may
properly be the subject of a fraud order did little more than remove doubt as to the
meaning of the statute.
69. 58 F.2d 820 (S.D. Iowa 1932).
70. Respondents have frequently made this contention. The courts have consistently
refuted it as they did in this case. See for example, Shaw v. Duncan, 194 F.2d 779
(10th Cir. 1952); Dr. J. H. McLean Medicine Co. v. United States, 253 Fed. 694, 696
(8th Cir. 1918).
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courts, but that in any event the opinion evidence in this case was even
more probative in that it was founded on reliable experiments. The court,
then, endorsed the specific test as a method for proving the falsity of a
claim in fraud order proceedings. By so doing it also accepted the test
as a method of proof that a representation is matter of fact. If this
standard could be successfully met by the government, then the claim
could not be regarded as matter of opinion which would be protected by
the McAnnulty rule.
The court in Farley v. Heininger' recognized another appropriate
method for establishing the falsity of the advertiser's claims. Heininger
represented that if patients would make their own impressions for false
teeth and send the impressions to him, he would make them a set of false
teeth which would give them complete satisfaction, fully restoring their
powers of mastication and enabling them to chew, eat, laugh, and smile
with perfect ease. The Post Office Solicitor introduced the testimony
of three experts who were extremely well qualified to speak on the sub-
ject of false teeth." At the hearing they testified that the appellee's
whole system was materially faulty in that it omitted several processes
which the dental profession regarded as absolutely essential. The ap-
pellee argued that the McAnnulty rule was applicable. The court coun-
tered, saying that while in McAnnulty the representation complained of
was not susceptible of scientific proof, in this case the matter dealt with
an established professional procedure which made the representations
easily susceptible of proof of falsity. This case made established pro-
fesisonal procedure a suitable method for proving the falsity of repre-
sentations." This same method of proof, of course, also proved that the
representation concerned matter that was fact.
In 1949, the Supreme Court voiced the most significant interpreta-
tion of the McAnnulty rule. The appellee in Reilly v. Pinkus"4 had de-
veloped a reducing plan which, in addition to dietary regimen, included
capsules made of kelp. Pinkus represented that persons suffering from
71. 105 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 587 (1939).
72. One of the experts was a practitioner who for several years prior to the hear-
ing had been a professor of prosthetic dentistry. Another expert was the dental expert
on the staff of the United States Public Health Service.
73. The "established professional procedure" method is analogous to the "consensus
of professional opinion" method noted earlier in the food and drug cases. Moreover,
the court, in a per curiam opinion in Cable v. Walker, 153 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 860 (1946), applied the consensus method in holding the fraud
order valid. The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of a remedy which he rep-
resented as being of great worth in the treatment of pyorrhea. Government expert
witnesses review the consensus of professional opinion on the subject of the treatment
of pyorrhea, and concluded that the appellant's product was worthless. On the basis of
this evidence, the dismissal of the complaint for an injunction was affirmed.
74. 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
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obesity could "eat plenty and lose 3 to 5 pounds a week surely and easily,
without tortuous diet and without feeling hungry." 5  The government
expert's testimony was based on the conclusions of the general consensus
of the medical profession and was to the effect that the iodine in the
kelp was valueless as an anti-fat. An expert witness for the respondent
took the opposite view, testifying that iodine did have value as an anti-
fat."6 After reviewing the opinions of the three lower courts, the Su-
preme Court held that the mere existence of a conflict of expert evidence
did not automatically invoke the McAnnulty rule. Both the circuit
court" and the respondent had contended that the testimony of the medi-
cal expert could never rise above mere opinion unless that expert had sub-
stantiated his testimony with the results of reliable experiments.7 In
reaffirming the consensus method for proving falsity, the Court said,
"We do not understand or accept [the McAnnulty holding]
as prescribing an inexorable rule that automatically bars re-
liance of the fact finding tribunal upon informed medical judg-
75. Reilly v. Pinkus, note 74 supra at 271.
76. Even he conceded that the iodine content in the appellee's recommended daily
dosage was 50 times less than the amount which might do some good.
77. Reilly v. Pinkus, 170 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1948).
78. After the fraud order issued, Pinkus brought suit in a New Jersey district
court to enjoin its enforcement. 61 F. Supp. 610 (D. N.J. 1945). The court granted
the injunction, finding that there was a "divergence of opinion as to the effectiveness
of the Kelpidine reducing plan and the inherent values of the kelp as used therein. Such
a showing is insufficient." supra at 614. The holding was based squarely on the
McAnnulty rule and Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922), was distinguished. Two
years later, the government-having succeeded in getting the permanent injunction
modified to a temporary injunction-returned answer and asked for a summary judg-
ment. On the hearing, the district court found the facts to be exactly the same as they
had previously found them. 71 F. Supp. 993 (D. N.J. 1947). The district court made
the injunction permanent, denying the government's motion for summary judgment.
Two years later, the circuit court found the facts to be substantially the same as the
lower court had found them. 170 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1948). After agreeing that the
McAnnulty rule controlled these facts, the court reasoned that Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S.
138 (1922), was not applicable because the government's case was not posited in such
a fashion as would warrant the application of the Leach case. The court said that the
Postmaster General had to pick one ground or the other. That is the findings should be
that the entire product was bad or that just some of the claims were false and fraudu-
lent. This was the first time that the courts had made this interpretation. With respect
to both McAnnulty and Leach the court emphasized that it was not that the evidence
could not have been presented to prove the case, but rather that it had not been. This
court held that the consensus method was not an acceptable method of proof and sug-
gested that the* only method of proof that would be acceptable was the controlled test
of the appellee's product. The dissenting judge was of the opinion that the Postmaster
General had made findings which would permit the fraud order to be sustained despite
the question of expert conflict as to the entire merits of the plan. He felt that it was
not the court's prerogative to resolve conflicting inferences, but rather it should confine
itself to an examination which would reveal that there was some basis for the order.
Following the circuit court's affirmance of the injunctive order, the Postmaster General
petitioned the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Because of the questions raised
in applying the McAnnidty rule, the writ was granted. 337 U.S. 906 (1949).
NOTES
ment every time medical witnesses can be procured who blindly
adhere to a curative technique thoroughly discredited by reliable
scientific experiences."79
The Court, by this ruling, did not denounce the specific test method for
proving falsity, but, rather, declared that it was not the only acceptable
one. The most significant aspect of the case was that the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the consensus method as being sufficient to prove falsity in
Post Office fraud orders.8"
79. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 274 (1949).
80. However, the Court did not exclude the McAmnudty rule entirely. It said that
the rule was a wholesome limitation on fraud order proceedings, "where the charges
concern medical practices in fields where knowledge has not yet been crystallized in the
crucible of experience." 338 U.S. at 274. The Court did not press the fraud order to
the entire merits of the Kelpidine plan. Instead, it was satisfied that the order could
be based on some of the representations, citing Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922).
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the circuit court's decree, because the hearing exam-
iner at the Post Office hearings had erroneously refused the respondent the opportunity
to cross-examine the government's experts with certain textual material. However, the
Postmaster General was free to reopen the hearings.
This case has been cited as authority in several recent cases. A fraud order had
been issued against the plaintiff in U. S. Nature Products v. Schaffer, 125 F. Supp. 374
(S.D. N.Y. 1954). The plaintiff manufactured Numal which he represented as an aid
to persons who desired to gain weight. In substance, the testimony of the government's
expert was that if Numal was taken with a glass of milk three times a day, there would
be a gain of 500 calories; that 450 of the 500 calaries would be attributable to the milk;
that this would amount to a gain of about one pound per week; and that persons who
had a constitutional diathesis for thinness would probably have their appetites decreased
because of the filling effects of the milk. In reviewing the evidence, the court said that
in some points the government's expert actually supported the claims made for the
product, and that in others his testimony was not pertinent. Thus, the court rendered
the expert evidence impotent to support the fraud order. Having eliminated any finding
of falsity, the court found that the fraudulent intent was also lacking. Both the rea-
soning and the result of this case are consistent with Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269
(1949).
That the full import of Reilly v. Pinkits is still not fully appreciated can be seen
in the court's opinion in Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954). It is
difficult to determine exactly what the court is saying or doing. From all appearances,
however, the court first went to the issue of fraud. The court found that the claims
made by the petitioner for his product amounted to no more than puffing, because "no
male of sufficient age to have any appreciable experience in such matters could in reason
be deceived by anything said in the plaintiff's circular." Jeffries v. Olesen, supra at
474. The case takes on special significance, however, because of the manner in which
the court regards Reilly I. Pinkus. The court used the Supreme Court decision to
substantiate its position on fraudulent intent, and then reverted to the circuit court
opinion for authority on the fact-opinion dichotomy. It is to be remembered that the
Supreme Court completely overthrew the circuit court's reasoning on the applicability of
the McAnnulty rule to the facts of Reilly v. Pinkus. The result of the instant case,
however, can be justified if the court's conclusion as to the lack of fraudulent intent is
accepted.
Reilly v. Pinkus was directly relied upon for authority in United States v. EI-O-
Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1951). The lower court had refused to grant
the government an injunction-a remedy afforded by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 52 STAT. 1040, 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1952). The appellee was marketing
a product called Vita Hormones. The government based its case on the contention that
the label did not adequately apprise the purchaser of the danger of self-application.
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One last case remains to be considered. The appellee in Shaw v.
Duncans" represented that his "Bloom Pills" were a cure for acne and
would give lasting relief. The experts testified that the pills had little,
if any, therapeutic value, and that they certainly could not accomplish
a cure or give lasting relief. These experts had no personal experience
with the product, but they had based their testimony on their experiences
with the various ingredients and on modern medical knowledge as ex-
pressed in the medical journals. The trial court, at the instance of the
appellee, found that since this was opinion testimony, it was "opinion"
within the meaning of McAnnulty 2 The circuit court said that the
McAnnulty rule could not be applied, inasmuch as there was no conflict
of expert evidence. The evidence was all positive and uncontroverted.
This holding added one more refinement to the McAnmulty rule as ap-
plied to fraud orders, viz., that if the appellee wished to invoke McAn-
nulty, at least he had to show that there was a conflict of medical views.83
Lacking such evidence, the most for which he could hope would be that
the government's evidence would not be believed. Quite possibly one
Government experts, leaders in their profession on the subject gave testimony support-
ing the position that the tablets were dangerous, especially if not carefully administered
by a physician after an examination of the patient. Experts for the appellee, also doc-
tors, testified that they had prescribed Vita Hormones many times, but had never
encountered a case of adverse results. In reversing the decision below the court said,
"We are not bound to reject informed medical judgment every time medical witnesses
can be produced who blindly adhere to a curative technique discredited by reliable
scientific experiences." szpra at 74. The same year in which the Supreme Court con-
sidered Reilly v. Pinkus, the 9th Circuit considered the case of Fanning v. Williams,
173 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1949). The appellee had advertised that his weight reducing plan
was safe and that it would pep up the users. Government experts, after a critical analy-
sis of the contents of the tablets, testified that it was not necessarily safe and that the
user would not necessarily be pepped up. The appellee had successfully argued in the
district court that the opinions of these experts were opinions within the meaning of the
McAnnulty rule. To a similar argument, the circuit court said, "We are unable to agree
with the conclusion that it is unsubstantial and mere opinion. It is the statement of
facts to the trained medical mind. These facts have been ascertained by experiments
conducted by many engaged in medical research through the years. . . . There is no
evidence in the record that trained and medical minds differ on the question that all per-
sons cannot use the same diet with safety." Fanning v. Wililams, supra at 96.
81. 194 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1952).
82. For similar instances where this contention has been refuted, consult note 70
supra.
83. "If there is a substantial divergence in the views of the profession, it was the
duty of the appellant [sic] to produce evidence showing the same before the trial ex-
aminer, but this he chose not to do. The undisputed evidence before the trial examiner
supports the finding of fraud." 194 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1952). This raises a ques-
tion whether there is a shifting of the burdens of persuasion and going forward. It does
not appear to alter the burden of persuasion; this remains with the government. How-
ever, once the government has established its prima facie case, the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence is shifted to the respondent on this issue of opinion-fact. He
may accomplish this by introducing the testimony of his own experts. (Presumably, if
the respondent's cross-examination of the government experts had successfully weakened
their testimony, the government would not have established its prima facie case.)
NOTES
more inference could be drawn from the case. The experts did not pur-
port to be reporting the consensus of medical opinion. Furthermore, it
was noted that they did not base their opinions on the results of any spe-
cific tests with the product. One might surmise that even in the fraud
order hearings the individual professional opinions of the experts might
be sufficient as substantial evidence, provided there was no traversing
expert testimony. While this appears to be a rational conclusion, it is not
borne out by any of the succeeding cases."'
Additionally, in a Post Office fraud order, there must be proof of
fraudulent intent. This is not a requisite element under the FTCA or
the F, D & C A of 1938. As was indicated at the outset of this discus-
sion, the McAnnulty case did not get to the question of fraudulent in-
tent." The principle set out in that case is pertinent only to the initial
determination of whether there exists a representation of fact. Only to
the extent that fraud requires a representation of fact does the McAnnulty
rule have any relation to the question of fraudulent intent."s
84. The inference that this analysis suggests has not been expressly promulgated
by the courts. Despite the court's rulings on the application of McAnnulty, the granting
of the injunction was nevertheless affirmed because the appellee had been unduly re-
stricted in his cross-examination of one of the expert witnesses.
85. Refer to the discussion at page - supra.
86. The court in Farley v. Heininger, 105 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 587 (1939), said that the determinative factor was not whether anyone com-
plained of fraud or was in fact defrauded, but whether the petitioner was using the
mails for a scheme which might result in the public being defrauded by false and fraudu-
lent statements. What must be proven is an actual intent to defraud. In 1954, a dis-
trict court heard the complaint for an injunction against the enforcement of a fraud
order in Atlanta Corporation v. Olesen, 124 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1954). While the
evidence presented would have raised the question of the applicability of the McAnnulty
rule, the court was satisfied merely to raise the question. It neglected to resolve that is-
sue, but preferred to decide the case on the ground that the petitioner had been denied
procedural due process in that she was refused in her attempts to give testimony that
would have negatived any fraudulent intent. It appears that a subjective test has been
utilized; various standards have been applied for proving the intent. In Dr. J. H.
McLean Medicine Co. v. United States, 253 Fed. 694 (8th Cir. 1918), the court found
that a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the representation was sufficient to
establish fraud. The president of the company testified that he did not know nor had he
attempted to learn whether the remedy had any therapeutic value; nor was he a druggist
or a doctor. This testimony became significant when the government showed that a
year and a half before the hearing the Secretary of Agriculture had notified him that
the labels on the bottles of medicine appeared to be misbranded with respect to the
therapeutic claims. Similarly, fraudulent intent was found in Cable v. Walker, 152
F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 860 (1946), where the appellant ad-
mitted that he had had no scientific training and that ranking testing laboratories had
refused to test his product, because they said it manifestly would not accomplish the
results claimed for it.
In Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), the Court endorsed the standard "univer-
sality of scientific belief." That is, if there was a universality of scientific belief that
the representations were untrue, fraud could be inferred. This standard was acknowl-
edged in the subsequent case of U.S. Nature Products v. Schaffer, 125 F. Supp. 374
(S.D. N.Y. 1954). The word "universality" has never been expressly ilefined. "Uni-
versality" may have the same meaning as "consensus"; then, again, it might represent
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Concluwion
That the McAnnulty case has had a significant effect in the three
statutory areas examined can hardly be doubted. Frequently, respond-
ents have urged that every representation of curative value falls within
the rule, or that the representations are merely the respondent's opinions
and, therefore, are "opinions" within the meaning of the rule, or that
when the government's evidence consists of the opinion of experts the
"opinion" rule of McAnnulty applies. These contentions have not been
successful, but they have engendered considerable confusion. In each
statutory area, acceptable methods of proof have been applied to offset
the mitigating effects of the rule. In the Federal Trade Commission
area, an individual expert's opinion based on his own general medical
and pharmacological knowledge has been sufficient proof that the repre-
sentation was false and a fact, even when confronted with contradictory
expert testimony. In the adjudication of cases under the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, the standard is somewhat higher. Only the
specific test method and the consensus of professional opinion method
have experienced a general application. One other method-the indi-
vidual expert's opinion-has not yet achieved as respectable a status. In
some higher standard. From other cases it would appear that in some circumstances
"universality" is no different than "consensus." In Fanning v. Williams, 173 F.2d 95
(9th Cir. 1949), the expert evidence used to prove the falsity of the claims was that
of the "consensus" type. There was no conflicting testimony. The court's opinion com-
pels the conclusion that this same evidence was also proof of fraudulent intent. In
Shaw v. Duncan, 194 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1952), there was also undisputed expert evi-
dence from which fraudulent intent was inferred. In Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1928), the evidence given by the appellant was his own testimony. He did
not purport to have any expert qualifications. Nevertheless, he was distributing a
remedy for tuberculosis which the government experts found to be worthless. Here,
too, the court found fraudulent intent. The factor common to these cases was that
there was no expert testimony opposed to that given by the government experts. The
logical inference is that where the government expert evidence is unopposed by other
expert evidence, the standard required for proof of fraudulent intent is the same as
the standard required for proof of falsity, viz., the consensus of professional opinion.
If this is a sound inference, then it may further be concluded that when such a situation
is presented fraud is really a constructive fraud, which is another way of saying that
the requirement of fraud has been eliminated It remains to be seen whether the courts
will permit the "consensus" standard for falsity to be used as the standard for proof of
fraudulent intent where there is a conflict of expert evidence. There was a conflict
of expert evidence in Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), and the "universality"
standard was used. The question really becomes-what will be sufficient to show good
faith? Could a respondent justifiably rely on the approval of a few doctors and sci-
entists? If so, then he may lack the requisite intent even though the consensus of medi-
cal opinion regards his representation as false. In such a case, perhaps, the "univer-
sality" standard is a higher standard than "consensus." If he may not rely on the ap-
proval of a few doctors and scientists, then the same standard for proof of falsity would
apparently apply also to the proof of fraudulent intent. The cases indicate that the
former-that he may so rely-is still the more likely rationale, but he must give evi-
dence to that effect.
NOTES
these cases the manufacturer acts at his peril in representing the merits
of his product.s7 The standards of proof in postal fraud orders are at
an even higher level. In addition to falsity, fraudulent intent must be
proved. The methods for proof of falsity and fact are similar to the
food and drug cases, viz., specific tests and consensus of professional
opinion. The standards of proof of fraudulent intent are recklessness,
universality of scientific belief, and, in some instances, the consensus of
professional opinion. The respondent not only acts at his peril with re-
spect to the truth or falsity of the claims, but he must also act in good
faith. The required standard of proof is lowest in Federal Trade Com-
mission actions and highest in Post Office fraud orders. This progres-
sion is entirely consistent with the severity of the sanctions which are
employed by the agencies. The Federal Trade Commission's cease and
desist order is the least feared; the respondent is merely ordered to stop
advertising in a certain way. The sanctions under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act are condemnation"8 or injunction. 9 The former is con-
fiscatory as to those products actually seized; the latter is preventive.
The sanction under the postal statute authorizing the fraud orders is the
most severe; all the respondent's mail is stopped and returned to the
sender marked "Fraudulent."9
What, then, is the contemporary influence of the McAnnulty rule?
While the confusion which has vexed applications of the rule has not been
entirely eliminated by the decisions of the courts, the present scope of
the rule indicates that the courts have substantially narrowed9 the area
which is matter of opinion by approving several methods for establish-
ing that the substance of the representation is matter of fact.
87. The comments of the House Committee Report are especially pertinent: "In
such circumstances, therefore, the manufacturer can easily ascertain by consulting quali-
fied experts in the field whether there is a material weight of opinion contrary to the
claims which he desires to make, and there would exist no uncertainty of the kind that
would invalidate the statute." H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1953).
88. United States v. 7 Jugs of Dr. Salsbury's Rakos, 53 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn.
1944).
89. For a recent case in which the government used the injunctive device, see
United States v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 198 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 897 (1953).
90. Justice Black's comments in Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), are par-
ticularly apropos in this respect. "Unlike the Postmaster General, the FTC cannot bar
an offender from using the mails, an order which could wholly destroy a business.
[There are] strikingly different consequences [in] the orders issued by the two agencies
on the basis of analogous representations. . . ." Reilly v. Pinkus, supra at 277.
91. "Moreover, it must be obvious that tremendous advancements in scientific
knowledge and certainty have been made since the rule in the McAnnulty case was first
announced. Questions which previously were subjects of opinion have now been
answered with certainty by the application of scientifically known facts. In the con-
sideration of the McAnnulty rule, the courts should give recognition to this advance-
ment." United States v. 7 Jugs of Dr. Salsbury's Rakos, 53 F. Supp. 746, 759 (D.
Minn. 1944).
